Fine-grained memory protection for C and C++ programs must track individual objects (or pointers), and store bounds information per object (or pointer). Its cost is dominated by metadata updates and lookups, making efficient metadata management the key for minimizing performance impact. Existing approaches reduce metadata management overheads by sacrificing precision, breaking binary compatibility by changing object memory layout, or wasting space with excessive alignment or large shadow memory spaces.
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite advances in software defenses, exploitation of systems code written in unsafe languages such as C and C++ is still possible. Security exploits use memory safety vulnerabilities to corrupt or leak sensitive data, and hijack a vulnerable program's logic. In response, several defenses have been proposed for making software exploitation hard.
Current defenses fall in two basic categories: those that let memory corruption happen, but harden the program to prevent exploitation, and those that try to detect and block memory corruption in the first place. For instance, Controlflow Integrity (CFI) [1] , [14] , [20] , [36] , [39] , [47] , [48] , [49] , [55] , [56] , [57] contains all control flows in a statically computed Control-flow Graph (CFG), while Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) hides the available CFG when the process executes. Both approaches can offer only probabilistic security [15] , [44] , since memory corruption is still possible, albeit exploitation is much harder.
A general approach to detect and block memory corruption is through tracking the bounds of object allocations [3] , [5] , [13] , [16] , [19] , [21] , [23] , [26] , [33] , [34] , [35] , [41] , [54] . The program is instrumented accordingly to use bounds information for blocking unintended accesses to objects. These systems can offer deterministic guarantees, since now memory corruption is prevented in the first place, however tracking all objects (or pointers) incurs heavy performance overheads.
Some existing techniques trade off compatibility for high locality of reference, however, it is desirable to minimise the disruption owing to tacit assumptions by programmers and compatibility with existing code or libraries that cannot be recompiled. In particular, so-called fat pointers [35] impose incompatibility issues with external modules, especially precompiled libraries in software-based solutions.
With these limitations in mind, object-capability models [9] , [28] , [50] , [51] using hardware-supported tags become very attractive, because they can manage compatibility and control runtime costs. But they are not supported in today's mainstream processor architectures, and, more importantly, cannot entirely avoid undesirable overheads such as metadata management related memory accesses just by virtue of being hardware-based.
In this paper, we present FRAMER, a software-based capability model using tagged pointers for fast metadata access. FRAMER provides efficient and flexible per-object metadata management that enables direct access to metadata by calculating their location using the (currently) unused top 16 bits of a 64-bit pointer to the object and a supplementary table. The key considerations behind FRAMER are as follows.
Firstly, FRAMER enables the memory manager freedom to place metadata in the associated header near the object to maximise spatial locality, which has positive effects at all levels of the memory hierarchy. Headers can vary in size, unlike approaches that store the header at a system-wide fixed offset from the object, which may be useful in some applications. Headers can also be shared over object instances (although we do not develop that aspect in this paper). Our evaluation shows excellent D-cache performance where the performance impact of software checking is, to a fair extent, mitigated by improved instructions per cycle (IPC).
Secondly, the address of the header holding metadata is derived from tagged pointers regardless of objects' alignment. We use a novel technique to encode the relative location of the header in unused bits at the top of a pointer. This streamlines metadata lookup, which has been the performance bottleneck of deterministic memory safety approaches. Moreover, the encoding is such, that despite being relative to the address in the pointer, the tag does not require updating when the address in the pointer changes. A supplementary table is used only for cases where the location information cannot be directly addressed with the additional 16-bits in the pointer. The address of the corresponding entry in the table is also calculated from our tagged pointer. This table is small compared to typical shadow memory implementations.
Thirdly, we avoid wasting memory from excessive padding and superfluous alignment, by encoding and using relative location for metadata access. Whereas existing approaches using shadow space [3] , [17] , [28] , [33] , [41] re-align or group objects to avoid conflicts in entries, FRAMER provides great flexibility in alignment, that completely removes constraining the objects or memory. The average of space overheads of our approach is 20% for full checking despite the generous size of metadata in our current implementation.
Fourthly, our approach facilitates compatibility. Our tag is encoded in otherwise unused bits at the top of a pointer, but the pointer size is unchanged and contiguity can be ensured.
The contributions of this paper are the following:
• We present an encoding technique for relative offsets that is interesting in its own right. It is both compact and also avoids imposing object alignment or size constraints. Moreover, it is favourable for hardware implementation and may find uses across different application domains.
• We design, implement and evaluate FRAMER, a generic framework for fast and practical object-metadata management with potential applications in memory safety, type safety and garbage collection.
• We present a case study of applying FRAMER to the problem of spatial memory safety, using our framework to allow inexpensive validation of pointer dereferences. We further discuss some kinds of violations of temporal safety that FRAMER prevents, and a potential application for type confusion prevention.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In this section we discuss techniques to detect memory errors. Static analysis detects errors at compile time and does not introduce run-time overhead, but must inevitably be overconservative, giving false alarms. In this paper, we focus only on run-time verification, but with compile-time assistance.
A. Metadata Association
Several approaches have been proposed for tracking memory and detecting memory-related errors. We review here systems that either track objects or pointers.
1) Object-based Tracking: An object-based approach stores bounds information per object. By not changing the memory layout of objects, it offers compatibility with current source and pre-compiled legacy libraries. In addition to checking pointer dereferences, these approaches may check pointer arithmetic to avoid losing track of the intended referent [23] , or otherwise risk false negatives for some spatial violations that stride over object boundaries. Moreover, object-based approaches checking pointer arithmetic should take special care to avoid false positives for valid out-of-bound pointers that are never dereferenced. Object-based approaches usually omit tracking of sub-objects such as an array member of a structure.
Due to the arbitrary size of objects, these approaches require some form of range-based lookup of objects using an in-bound address, which can be more expensive than a simple lookup. An early approach used a splay tree to reduce the overhead [23] , but more efficient systems simplify the lookup by using table access to shadow memory regions. We will discuss the details in Section II-B.
2) Pointer-based tracking: Pointer-based approaches associate bounds information with pointers. Per-pointer metadata holds the valid range that a pointer is allowed to point to. Unlike object-based approaches, this enables them to detect internal overflows easier, such as an array out-of-bounds inside a structure, so pointer-based approaches can guarantee near complete memory safety. One drawback is the additional runtime overhead from metadata copy and update at pointer assignment, while object-based approaches update metadata only at memory allocation/release. In addition, the number of pointers can be larger than that of allocated objects, so pointer-intensive programs may suffer from heavier runtime overheads.
B. Metadata Storage
Memory safety enforcement techniques fall into two categories depending on whether metadata is disjoint or embedded in each object or pointer.
1) Embedded Metadata: a) Fat Pointers: Fat pointers [5] , [22] , [35] embed metadata in each pointer as shown in Fig. 1a . They provide speed with the highest locality of references by avoiding extra memory access for metadata update/retrieval, however, they break binary compatibility due to expansion of the pointer representation. In addition, fat pointers are vulnerable to metadata corruption by store operations after unsafe typecast operations on pointers. Hence, it is essential to check typecasts to guarantee near-complete memory safety.
b) Tagged Pointers: To avoid fat pointers, several techniques using embedded metadata employ tagged pointers instead. SGXBounds [27] utilizes tagged pointers like FRAMER and makes objects carry their metadata in a footer as shown in Fig. 1b . In SGXBounds, a 64-bit pointer's lower 32 bits hold the address, and the higher 32 bits hold the referent object's upper bound, i.e. the location of the metadata footer. The footer contains a lower bound (base), and may hold other metadata. This approach works when there are enough spare bits in pointers, which is the case with SGX enclaves, where only 36 bits of virtual address space are currently supported. Storing the absolute address of bounds frees SGXBounds from false negatives/positives that challenge many object-tracking approaches. The use of a footer provides fairly high locality of references, and is less vulnerable to metadata corruption by unsafe typecast than fat pointers.
Other techniques, such as Baggy Bounds Checking [3] and Low-fat Pointers [28] use different compromises to support larger address spaces without changing the pointer size.
2) Disjoint Metadata: Disjoint metadata achieves memory layout compatibility by storing metadata in a separate memory region. A high-level data structure, such as a hash table, simplifies implementation and manipulation of metadata, however, runtime overheads can be lower when using a shadow space that allows direct array access to metadata [3] , [8] , [10] , [17] , [33] , [35] , [40] , [53] . Early techniques using shadow spaces create a mirror copy of application space, i.e. byte-tobyte mapping, but more recent techniques reduced the size of shadow space with compact encoding, re-arranging objects and so on.
SoftBound [33] is a pointer-based approach that uses either a hash table and shadow space, while ensuring compatibility and protecting sub-objects, and shows that the use of shadow space reduces runtime overhead, on average, by 2/3 compared with using table lookup [32] .
Baggy bounds checking (BBC) [3] is an object-based approach that includes an implementation using shadow memory that maps fixed-sized memory blocks to one byte-sized entries in shadow space. BBC re-arranges objects and aligns them to the base of a block, to prevent metadata conflicts caused by multiple objects in one block. BBC pads each object to the next power of two, so that each shadow table entry stores only the binary logarithm of the padded object size. These significantly reduce the size of the shadow space, but perform approximate bounds checking, that tolerates pointers going out-of-bounds yet within the padded bound.
Address Sanitizer [41] (ASan) utilizes shadow space in a different way. It pads each object with redzone(rz) front and back (Fig. 2a) , and considers access to this rz as out-of-bounds. The errors (i.e. access to rz) are identified by the value in the corresponding entry in the shadow. At memory access, ASan derives the address of its corresponding entry from a pointer, and the entry tells if the address is addressable or not. ASan maps 8 bytes in application space into one byte in shadow space, and values in the bytes are written at object allocation.
ASan also detects some dangling pointers, by forcing freed objects to stay in a so-called quarantine zone for a while. Disadvantage of ASan is that its error detection relies on spatial or temporal distance. It loses track of pointers going far beyond of rz and reaching another object's valid range, so fails to address false negatives caused by violation of intended referents. The wider the rz, the more errors ASan detects. use-after-free errors cannot be detected, in the cases where dangling pointers are used to access objects after the pointer is freed from the quarantine. ASan detects most errors, but it is less deterministic in theory.
Disjoint memory ranges can offer protection from metadata manipulation, ranging from surrounding the memory area with unmapped pages and randomizing its base address, to range checking all memory accesses.
C. Hardware-based Approaches
Instruction set extensions for bounds checking [10] , [19] , [28] , [38] , [51] have been proposed to overcome runtime overheads and limitations of software-based approaches. Intel MPX [19] , [32] , [37] is an ISA extension that provides a hardware-accelerated pointer checking using disjoint metadata. MPX has four registers: one holds a pointer itself, two for upper and lower bounds, and the last register keeps a copy of the pointer. If there is a mismatch between a pointer and the copy, MPX considers the pointer has been updated in uninstrumented code and gives up tracking of the pointer. This mechanism provides incremental deployment and seamless integration of codes. Reportedly, the MPX approach suffers due to lack of memory even with small working sets [27] and has turned out to be slow for pointer-intensive programs, owing to the restricted number of special-purpose bounds registers (4 registers) is soon exceeded, requiring spill operations from regions of memory that themselves require management and consume D-cache bandwidth and capacity.
III. FRAMER APPROACH
In this section we provide a high-level description of how FRAMER handles per-object metadata efficiently. In a nutshell, the idea is to place per-object metadata close to its object (normally in a header) and streamline metadata lookup by calculating the location from only (1) an inbound pointer and (2) additional information tagged in the otherwise unused, top 16 bits. We exploit the fact that relative addresses can be encoded in far fewer bits than absolute addresses provided there is assistance from the memory manager to restrict the distance between the allocation for an object and a separate object for its metadata. In many cases, the metadata can be stored in front of the object, essentially as a header, requiring only a single memory manager allocation. The relative distance between object and metadata is then normally sufficiently small to be encoded in relative form in the top 16 bits. But there are cases where relative location information cannot be used, such as when allocating large objects or with some small objects depending on their absolute address, to avoid imposing alignment constraints on them. We We are now going to present the concept of frames. In Section III-C we thoroughly present how metadata are actually stored for each different object.
A. Frame Definitions
FRAMER stores metadata for all objects in separate blocks that are placed nearby by FRAMER's memory manager. User blocks are unchanged in layout, but their metadata can be accessed with minimal additional cache misses. We record a mapping between a block and its metadata using the top 16 bits of a 64-bit pointer, which are spare in contemporary CPUs. As we show below, the code to resolve the metadata address from the inbound pointer is very fast. It does not involve any time-consuming traversal/lookup for metadata access.
To record the relative offset between a block and its metadata we define a logical structure over the whole data space of a process, including statics, stack, and heap. The FRAMER structures are based on the concept of frames, defined as memory blocks that are 2 n -sized and aligned by their size, where n is a non-negative integer. A frame of size 2 n is called n-frame. A memory object x will intrinsically lie inside at least one bounding frame, and x's wrapper frame is defined as the smallest frame completely containing x inside. For instance, in Fig. 3 , objects a,b and c's wrapper frames are (n = 1)-frame (or 1-frame), 4-frame, and 3-frame, respectively. For 0 ≤m<n, we call m-frames placed inside a n-frame f, f's subframes.
Frames have several interesting properties. Firstly, a n-frame is aligned by 2 m for all m < n. Secondly, an object's wrapper frame size need not grow in proportion to the object's size. As shown in Fig. 3 , the object b has a larger wrapper frame than c, even though b's size is smaller. This is because the wrapper frame size for an object is determined by both the object's size and location. Thirdly, a memory object x's wrapper frame is a frame containing x in it, and having the base (i.e. lower bound) and upper bound of x in its lower-addressed (n − 1)-subframe and higher-addressed (n − 1)-frame, respectively. It is trivial to prove this as presented in Appendix 0a.
Following basic malloc semantics, FRAMER does not natively support object movement or growth (we reset its wrapper frame at realloc). Therefore, there exists the unique wrapper frame for each object, and it is determined at memory allocation. We use it as a reference point to obtain relative location information for each object, since it does not change during the life time of the object. At memory allocation, we determine the wrapper frame for the allocated object and tag the relative location in the pointer using the wrapper frame size.
B. Frame Selection
Now we show how to get the size of the wrapper frame, given an object. We call an object whose wrapper frame is n-frame an n-object. For any k-object o, its wrapper frame (i.e., k-frame) is aligned by 2 k by definition, addresses of all the bytes in the frame have the same value setting of most significant (64 − k) bits, and so do the addresses of all bytes in o. In addition, the base and upper bound are located in the lower and higher-addressed (k − 1)-frame, respectively. This means that the (k − 1) th least significant bit of the base and upper bound must be negated.
Based on these, we can get k, log 2 of the size of o's wrapper frame. Let's say (b 63 , ..., b 1 , b 0 ) and (e 63 , ..., e 1 , e 0 ) are bit vectors of k-object o's base and upper bound respectively, and X is a don't care value. We get the log 2 (wrapper frame size) by performing XOR (exclusive OR) and CLZL (count leading zeros) operations as follows (b 63 is the most significant):
We then get k by subtracting the result of clzl operation from 64: 64 − (64 − k) = k.
C. Metadata Storage Management
As said, FRAMER stores metadata per object at an address that can be derived from a tagged pointer. Objects carry their metadata in a header associated with themselves. We encode the relative location of metadata using the wrapper frame size of each object. Assuming the header has a size of h, the base address of the object is the header address plus h bytes, hence, the base of an object does not need to be stored for bounds checking. For instance, in Fig. 5 , a, b and c are all objects containing a h-sized header.
FRAMER considers two core types of objects, depending on their wrapper frame size, namely small-framed and bigframed objects, and re-structures the virtual address space as follows. FRAMER divides user space into slots with a fixed size of 2 15 bytes and aligned to their size, i.e., (N = 15)-frames. Slots are set to a size of 2 15 so that the offset to the header of small-framed objects ((N ≤ 15)-objects) can be encoded in the unused 15 bits of a pointer. In Fig. 5 , d a is the offset to the header of the small-framed object a. Typically, we expect the number of big-framed objects to be low compared to small-framed objects.
One extra bit, in particular the most significant, is taken for the flag property, which indicates if the object is small-framed or big-framed ((N > 15)-objects) as shown in Fig. 4 . The descriptor of big-framed objects requires more bits of information (described in III-C2). For big-framed objects, FRAMER creates one array -can be interpreted as shadow space -that holds additional location information. The corresponding entry of a big-framed object is then directly accessed only with a tagged pointer. We stress here that this array is not needed for lookups associated with small-framed objects, and is smaller than typical shadow memory implementations where each entry corresponds to an aligned memory word.
1) Small-framed Objects: Since small-framed objects are placed in a single slot, we simply tag a pointer with the offset from the base address of the slot to the header of the object. We further turn on the most significant bit of the pointer to indicate that the particular object is small-framed. When we retrieve metadata from a header of an small-framed object, (i.e., flag==1) inbound (in-slot) pointers are derived to the base of the slot by zeroing the least significant 15 (log 2 (slot size)) bits, and then to the address of the header by adding the offset to the base address of the slot as follows: 2) Big-framed Objects: Big-framed objects span several slots, thus their offset cannot be solely used as their relative location. Zeroing the least 15 significant bits (log slotsize) of a pointer does not always lead to a unique slot base. In Fig. 5 , an object b's inbound pointer can derive two different slots (slot0 and slot1) depending on the pointer's value, and that is the case for object c (slot1 and slot2). Hence, for big-framed objects, we need to store additional location information in our supplementary table.
During program initialisation, we create an array, and each entry is mapped to a 16-frame. We call such a frame a division. Each entry contains one sub-array and the sub-array per division is called a division array. Each division array contains the fixed number of entries in the current implementation as follows:
typedef struct Entries { void * header_addr; / * The header address * / } EntryT; typedef struct ShadowTableEntries { EntryT division_array [48] ; / * 64-16 * / } DivisionT;
Contrary to small-framed objects, we tag binary logarithm of their wrapper frame size (i.e. N ==log 2 2 N ) in pointers to big-framed objects. The address of an entry in a division array ... 47 48 0 ... b and c are big-framed. da is the offset to a. h denotes a header and |ta| is the size of a. b and c's entries are mapped to the same division array. The entries in the division arrays store their corresponding object's header location, while the small-framed object a does not have an entry. Only one entry of division1's array is actually used, since the division is not aligned by 2 17 .
is then calculated from an inbound pointer and the N value, and the entry holds the address of a header. By definition, a wrapper frame of an (N ≥ 16)-object is aligned by its size, 2 N , therefore, the frame is also aligned by 2 16 . This implies that a (N ≥ 16)-frame shares the base address with certain division, and is mapped to one division. In addition, each object has an intrinsic N -value, since each object has one wrapper frame. Each 2 16 frame is mapped to one division array, so we keep the header address of each (N ≥ 16)-object in one of entries of the division array.
Each (N ≥ 16)-object maps to one division array, but that division array contains entries for multiple big-framed objects. In Fig. 5 , both division0 and 17-frame0 are mapped to division0. Their mapped division (division0) is aligned by 2 17 at minimum, while division1 is aligned by 2 16 at max. Here, the tag N is used as an index to identify big-framed objects mapped to the same division array. For each N ≥ 16, at most one N -object is mapped to one division array, and the proof is presented in Appendix 0b. We use the value N as an index of a division array, and tag N in the pointer. Given a N value-tagged pointer (flag==0), we derive the address of an entry as follows: The base of the wrapper frame (i.e. the base of the division) is obtained by zeroing the least significant N bits of the pointer. We, then, get the address to its division array from the distance from the base of virtual address space and 2 16 ). Finally we access the corresponding entry with the index N in the division array.
Entries in a division array may not always be used, since an entry corresponds to one big-framed object, which is not necessarily allocated at any given time, e.g. if object b is not allocated in the space in Fig. 5 , 0th element of division0's array would be empty. This feature is used for detecting some dangling pointers, and more details are explained in section V-B.
Unlike existing approaches using shadow space, FRAMER does not re-align objects to avoid conflicts in entries. Our wrapper frame-to-entry mapping allows wrapper frames to be overlapped, that gives full flexibility to memory manager.
We could use different forms of a header such as a remote header or a shared header for multiple objects, with considering a cache line, stack frame, or page. In addition, although we fixed the division size (2 16 ), future designs may offer better flexibility in size, as long as entries are not overlapped.
We showed how to directly access per-object metadata only with a tagged pointer. Our approach eliminates expensive traversal in the data structure; gives great flexibility to associate metadata with each object; gives full freedom to arrange objects in memory space, that removes re-alignment of objects unlike existing approaches using shadow space. This mechanism can be exploited for other purposes: the metadata can hold any per-object data.
IV. FRAMER IMPLEMENTATION
This section describes the current implementation of FRAMER which is largely built using LLVM. Additionally, we discuss how we offer compatibility with existing code.
A. Overview
There are three main parts to our implementation: FRAMER LLVM passes, and the static library (lib), and the binary lib in the dashed-lined box as shown in Fig. 6 . The target C source code and our hooks' functions in the static lib are first compiled to LLVM intermediate representation (IR). Our main transformation pass instruments memory allocation, deallocation, memory access, or optionally pointer arithmetic in the target code in IR. In general, instrumentation simply inserts a call to lib functions, performing metadata update or bounds checking, however, our using of header-attached objects and tagged pointers requires extra program transformation at compile-time. The third part is wrappers around malloc family routines and string functions. Compiler optimizations are discussed in Section VI.
The flexible structure of LLVM allowed these to be implement using function interposition and two additional IR traversals, but we also had to modify the LLVM framework slightly. Our main transformation is implemented as a LLVM Link Time Optimization (LTO) pass for whole program analysis, and run as a LTO pass on gold linker [31] , however, incremental compilation is also possible.
We also insert a prologue that is performed on program startup. The prologue reserves address space for the supplementary metadata table, and pages are allocated on demand.
B. Transformation of Memory Allocation
We instrument memory allocation and deallocation to update metadata, and also transform the target IR code at compile time for a header and tagged pointer. It then inserts a callsite to our hook function at allocation. The hook decides if it is small or big-framed, updates metadata in the header, and also in the entry for big-framed objects. It then creates a tag (offset or N value), and moves the pointer to the second field whose type is the actual allocated type in the target program. The hook returns a tagged pointer. The allocation of an original object is removed by FRAMER's pass, after the pass replaces all the pointers to the original object with the tagged pointer to the new object.
We instrument function epilogues to reset entries for bigframed non-static objects. Currently we instrument all the epilogues, but this instrumentation can be removed for better performance.
2) Statically-allocated objects (address-taken globals): Transformation on static objects (global variables) is similar to handling local ones on the stack. Creating a new global object with a header attached is straightforward, however, other parts of implementation are more challenging.
Some operations on stack objects (decision of a wrapper frame size, creating a tag, updating metadata, and tagging a pointer) are performed in the hook, and the role of the transformation pass is to replace all the pointers to an original object with the return value of the hook (i.e. a tagged one). This cannot be applied to global objects, since the return value of a function is non-constant, while the original pointer's users having it as an operand may be constant. For example, an original pointer (compile-time constant), may be an initializer of other global/static objects, or an operand of some constant expression (LLVM ConstExpr) [30] . Global variables' initializer and ConstExpr's operands must be constant, hence, the operations performed in a hook for stack objects should be done by a transformation pass for global objects.
In addition, while the tag should be generated at compiletime, the wrapper frame size is determined by their actual addresses on memory, that are known only at run-time. To implement a tagged pointer generated from run-time information at compile-time, FRAMER's transformation pass builds ConstExpr of (1) the wrapper frame size N (2) offset, (3) tag and flag selection depending on its wrapper frame size, (4) pointer arithmetic operation to move the pointer to the second field, and then finally (5) constructs a tagged pointer based on them. The original pointers are replaced with this constant tagged pointer. The concrete value of the tagged pointer is then propagated at run-time, when the memory addresses for the base and bound are assigned.
FRAMER inserts a call to a function at the entry of main function for each object. The function updates metadata in the header and the address in the entry, for big-framed ones, during program initialisation.
3) Heap objects: We interpose calls to malloc, realloc, and calloc at link time with wrapper functions in our binary libraries. The wrappers add the user-defined size by the header size; call malloc and realloc; and the rest of operations are the same as the hook for stack objects. calloc takes the number of elements and the size of an element, so we add minimum number of elements to hold the header (This allows spare bytes at the end of the object).
We also interpose free with our wrapper. This performs resetting an entry for a big-framed object, and releasing the object with the hidden base (i.e. the address of the header).
C. Memory Access
FRAMER's transformation pass inserts a call to our bounds checking function right before each store and load, such that each pointer is examined and its tag stripped-off before being dereferenced. The hook extracts the tag from a pointer, gets the header location, performs the check using metadata in the header, and then returns an untagged pointer after cleaning the tag. The transformation pass replaces a tagged pointer operand of store/load with an untagged one to avoid segmentation fault caused by dereferencing it.
Bounds checking and tag cleaning are also performed on memcpy, memmove and memset in similar way. (Note that LLVM overrides the C lib functions to their intrinsic functions [29] ). memmove and memcpy has two pointer operands, so we instrument each argument separately.
As for string functions, we interpose these at link time. Wrapper functions performs checking on strings, call real functions with pointers with a tag removed, and then restore tagged pointers.
D. Interoperability
FRAMER ensures compatibility between instrumented modules and regular pointer representation in pre-compiled non-instrumented libraries. We strip off tagged pointers before passing them to non-instrumented functions. FRAMER adds a header to objects for tracking, but this does not introduce incompatibility, since it does not change the internal memory layout of objects or pointers.
V. FRAMER APPLICATIONS
In this section we discuss how FRAMER can be used for building security applications. We focus mainly on spatial safety. Nevertheless, we discuss additional case studies related to temporal safety and type checking.
A. Spatial Memory Safety
In a nutshell, FRAMER tracks individual memory allocations, and associates metadata with them. The metadata is stored in the header associated with an object, and the offset, or the wrapper frame information (N value), is tagged in the pointer. We update the metadata and tag at object allocation; metadata is retrieved at memory access (store, load and selected standard library functions). The tagged pointers must be stripped of their tag before being dereferenced to prevent segmentation fault. Unlike other object-tracking or relative location-based approaches, FRAMER can tackle legitimate pointers outside the object bounds without padding objects or requiring metadata retrieval or bounds checking at pointer arithmetic operations.
In this section, we describe how FRAMER performs bounds checking at run-time. 1) Memory allocation: As described in Section IV-B, a header is prepended to memory objects (lines 1, 2 in Table I ). For spatial safety, this header must hold at least the raw object size, but can hold additional information such as a type id. This could be used for additional checks for sub-object bounds violations or type confusion, but we do not experiment with these in this work. An object's base address is obtained by adding sizeof(headerTy) to the header address, once we get the header address from a tagged pointer.
Once a new object is allocated, an instrumented function (handle_alloc) updates metadata, moves the pointer to (new_A->A), and then tags it (line 3). The pointer to the removed original object is replaced with a tagged one (A to tagged in line 5).
2) Pointer arithmetic: Going out-of-bounds at pointer arithmetic is not memory corruption as long as they are not dereferenced. However, skipping checks at pointer arithmetic can lose track of pointers' intended referents. Memory access to these pointer can be seen valid in many object boundsbased approaches. To keep track of intended referents, objecttracking approaches may have to check bounds at pointer arithmetic [23] . However, performing bounds checks only at pointer arithmetic may therefore cause false positives, where a pointer going out-of-bounds by pointer arithmetic is not dereferenced as follows: int * p; int * a = malloc(n * sizeof(int)); for (p = a; p < &a[100]; p++) * p = 0;
On the exit of for loop, p goes out-of-bounds yet is not dereferenced -this is not an error in C standard. [3] handles this by marking the pointers during pointer arithmetic, and sending errors when dereferenced, or padding an object by off-by-one byte, causing most of the false positives [23] .
Instead of padding, we include one imaginary off-by-one byte (or multiple bytes) when deciding the wrapper frame (see Section III-B) on memory allocation. The fake padding then is within the wrapper frame, and pointers to this are still derived to the header, even when they land another object by pointer arithmetic. The biggest advantage of fake padding is that it is allowed to be overlapped with neighboring objects. The fake padding does not cause conflict of N value with another object on the supplementary table possibly overlapping the bytes.
FRAMER tolerates pointers to the padding at pointer arithmetic, and reports errors on attempts to access them. FRAMER detects those pointers being dereferenced, since bounds checking at memory access retrieves the raw size of the object.
Currently FRAMER adds fake padding only in the tail of objects, but it could be also attached at the front to track pointers going under lower bounds.
Above utilizing fake padding, to make a stronger guarantee for near-zero false negatives, we could perform in-frame checking (currently disabled) at pointer arithmetic (line 6 in Table I ). We can derive the header address of an intended referent, as long as the pointer stays inside its wrapper frame (slot for small-framed), in any circumstance. In Fig. 7 , consider a pointer (p), and its small-framed referent (a). Assuming p going out-of-bounds to p' by pointer arithmetic, p' even violates its intended referent, but p' is still within slot0. Hence, p' is derived to a's header by zeroing lower log 2 (slot size) (15) bits and adding offset. This is applied the same for big-framed objects. and also violates its intended referent (a to b). FRAMER still can keep track of its referent, since p' is in-frame. p" is out-of-frame, which we catch at pointer arithmetic.
Hence, we could check only out-of-frame (p" in Fig. 7 ) by performing simple bit-wise operations (no metadata retrieval) checking if p and p' are in its wrapper frame (or slot for small-framed). FRAMER's only false positives are out-of-frame pointers getting back in-frame without being dereferenced, which is very rare. Those uses will be usually optimised away by compiler above optimisation level -O1, and normally the distance between an object's and its wrapper frame's bounds is large.
3) Memory access: As mentioned in Section IV-C, we instrument memory access by replacing pointer operands with a return of our hook, so that the pointers are verified and tagstripped, before being dereferenced (line 7,8 in Table I) .
check_bounds first reads a tagged pointer's flag telling if the object is small or big-framed. As we described in Section III-C1 and III-C2, we derive the header address from either an offset or an entry, and then get an object's size from the header and its base address as follows: obj_base = header_addr + sizeof(HeaderTy); obj_size = (HeaderTy * )header_addr->size;
We then check both under/overflows ( (1) and (2) below, respectively). Detection of underflows is essential for FRAMER to prevent overwrites to the header. In a similar fashion, we instrument memcpy, memmove, memset, and string functions (strcpy, strncmp, strncpy, memcmp, memchr and strncat). Handling individual function depends on how each function works. For instance, strcpy copies a string src up to null-terminated byte, and src's length may not be equal to the array size holding it. As long as the destination array is big enough to hold src, it is safe, even if the source array is bigger than the destination array. Hence, we check if the destination size is not smaller than strlen(src), returning the length up to the null byte as follows: On the other hand, strncpy copies a string up to userspecified n bytes, so we check both sizes of destination and source arrays are bigger than n. Metadata for both arrays are retrieved for bounds checking unlike handling strcpy.
B. Temporal Memory Safety
Although our primary focus in this paper is spatial safety, FRAMER can also detect some forms of temporal memory errors [2] , [11] , [34] , [42] that we now discuss briefly.
Each big-framed object is mapped to an entry in a division array in the supplementary table, and the entry is mapped to at most one big-framed object for each N . We make sure an entry is set to zero whenever a corresponding object is released. This way, we can detect an attempt to free an already deallocated object (i.e. a double free), by checking if the entry is zero. Access to a deallocated object (i.e. use-afterfree) is detected in the same way during metadata retrieval for a big-framed object. Note that this cannot detect invalid temporal intended referents, i.e., an object is released, a new object mapped to the same entry is allocated, and then a pointer attempts to access the first object.
Detection of dangling pointers for small-framed objects is out of scope of current implementation.
C. Type Cast Checking
The majority of type casts in C/C++ programs are either upcasts (conversion from a descendant type to its ancestor type) or downcasts (in the opposite direction). Upcasts are considered safe, and this can be verified at compile time, since if a source type of upcasts is a descendant type, then the type of the allocated object at runtime is also a descendant type.
In contrast, the target type of downcasts may mismatch the run-time type (RTT). If an allocated object's type is a descendant type of the target type at downcast, access to an object after downcasts may cause boundary overruns including internal overflows. This is a vulnerability commonly known as type confusion [16] , [21] , [24] , [25] . The RTT is usually unknown statically due to inter-procedural data flows, so downcasts require run-time checking to prevent this type confusion.
RTT verification is more challenging than upcast checking at compiler-time, since it requires pointer-to-type mapping. We need to track individual objects (or pointers) and store perobject (pointer) type information in the database. In addition, RTT checking requires mappings of unique offsets to fields corresponding to types of sub-objects. FRAMER could be the basis of metadata storage (mapping a pointer to per-object type) with supplementary type descriptors. FRAMER's header can hold corresponding per-object type layout information (i.e. a list of types at each offset in the object type) or its type ID for the object, and all type layout information and type-compatibility relations can be stored in the type descriptors (implementations can vary). FRAMER's current implementation as an LTO pass makes it easier to collect all used types of the whole program.
Downcasts may be critical for approaches using embedded metadata (Section II-B1), since memory writes after unsafe type casts on program's user data can pollute metadata in a neighboring object's header. Prevention of metadata corruption is easier with FRAMER than with fat pointers. We can detect memory overwrites to another object's header caused by downcasts by simply keeping track of structure-typed objects and using our bounds checking. Unlike fat pointers, we do not need to check internal overflows by unsafe downcasts to protect metadata, since metadata is placed outside an object.
VI. OPTIMISATIONS
We applied both our customised and LLVM built-in optimisations. This section describes our own optimisations. Suggestion of further optimisations is provided later in Section VIII-B. a) Implementation Considerations: As described in Section IV-B2, all occurrences of an original pointer to a global object are replaced with a tagged pointer created using a constant expression (LLVM ConstExpr). Unfortunately, we experienced runtime hotspots due to the propagation of the tagging expression to every ConstExpr using the original pointer. To work around this issue we created a helper global variable for each global object, assigned the constant tagged pointer to it during program initialisation, and then replaced the occurrences of an original pointer with the corresponding helper variable. This way, runtime overheads are reduced. For instance, benchmark anagram's overhead decreased from 14 seconds to 1.7 seconds.
b) Non-array Objects: We do not track non-array objects that are not involved with pointer arithmetic, e.g., int-typed objects. It is redundant to perform bounds checking or untagging for pointers to them. We filter out simple cases, easily recognised, from being checked. In the general case, it is not trivial to determine if a pointer is untagged at compile time, since back-tracing the assignment for the pointer requires whole-program static analysis. c) Safe Pointer Arithmetic: Instead of full bounds checks, we only strip off tags for pointers involved in pointer arithmetic and statically proven in-bound. For pointers where the bounds can be determined statically, as in the following example, we insert only runtime bounds checks and avoid the metadata retrieval:
... * (a + n) ...
d) Hoist Run-time Checks
Outside Loops: Loopinvariant expressions can be hoisted out of loops, thus improving run-time performance by executing the expression only once rather than at each iteration. We modified SAFECode's [12] , [43] loop optimisation passes. We apply hoisting checks to monotonic loops, and pull loop invariants that do not change throughout the loop, and scalars to the pre-header of each monotonic loop. While iterating our run-time checks inside each loop including inner loops, we determine if the pointer is hoistable. If hoistable, we place a scalar evolution expression along with its run-time checks outside the loop, and delete the old checks inside loop.
e) Inlining Function Calls in the Loop: Inlining functions can improve performance, however it can bring more performance degradation due to the bigger size of the code (runtime checks are called basically at every memory access). Currently, we only inline bounds checks that are inside loops to minimise code size.
VII. EVALUATION
We measured the performance of FRAMER on C benchmarks from the full set of Olden [7] , Ptrdist [4] , and a subset of SPEC CPU 2006 [18] . For each benchmark we measured four binary versions: un-instrumented, only store-checked and full (both load and store checking enabled) on FRAMER, and ASan. The same set of compiler optimisations in the same order are applied to four versions. In addition, we disabled ASan's memory leak detection at run-time and halting on error in order to force ASan to continue after error detection. This is to measure overheads in the same setting as FRAMER. Binaries were compiled with the regular LLVM-clang version 4.0 using optimisation level -O2. Measurements were taken on an Intel R Xeon R E5-2687W v3 CPU with 132 GB of RAM. Results were gathered using perf. Table II summarises the average of metrics of the baseline and the two instrumented tests.
In this text, cache and branch misses refer to L1 D-cache misses and branch prediction misses both per 1000 instructions (MPKI), respectively.
A. Memory Overhead
Our metadata header was a generous 16 bytes per object. The big-frame array had 48 elements for each 16-frame (division) in use where the element size was 8 bytes to hold full address of the header. The header size and the number of elements of each division array can be reduced, but this is our early implementation. Currently all the header objects were aligned by 16 for compatibility with the llvm.memset intrinsic function that sometimes assumes this alignment. Despite inflation of space using larger than needed headers and division array entries and some changes of alignment, we see FRAMER's space overheads are very low at 1.22 and 1.23 as shown in Fig. 9 . These measurements reflect code inflation for instrumenting both loads and stores.
The memory overheads of FRAMER are low and stable compared to other approaches [33] , [41] . ASan's average normalised overheads are 8.84 (increase by 784%) for the same working set in our experiments, and the highest and lowest overheads are 4766% for the test hmmer and 8% for sjeng, respectively. The average memory overhead of FRAMER is 22% ∼ 23% for both store-only and full checking, and only two tests, perlbench.2 (84%) and yacr2 (116%) recorded comparably higher growth than other tests. The two tests produce many small-sized objects, for example, perlbench allocates many 1-byte-sized heap objects. Currently FRAMER instruments every heap object, so attaching a 16-byte-sized header to all the 1-byte-sized objects made the increase higher. FRAMER's overheads for those benchmarks are still much lower than ASan's: 2808% for perlbench.2 and 714% for yarc2. Fig. 8 reports the slowdown per benchmark (relative number of additional cycles). The average is 70% for store-only and 223% for full checking.
B. Slowdown
Our performance degradation is mainly due to increased dynamic instructions. For full-checking, anagram (410%) and ks (452%) stand out for high overheads despite its smaller program size, mostly due to heavy recursion and excessive allocations causing big growth in executed instructions (674% for anagram, 812% for ks) as shown in Fig. 11 , but decreases in cache misses are moderate (76% for anagram, 81% for ks) compared to average (decreased by 63%). On contrast, mcf recorded the highest instruction overheads (1097%), but cache misses (91%) and branch misses (92%) after instrumentation are dropped the biggest among all the tests, so run-time overhead did not grow in proportion to increased instruction count. perlbench and bzip sets' overheads are high in both FRAMER and ASan, and ASan recorded better speed in the sets (perlbench: 405% (FRAMER) and 299% (ASan), and bzip: 376% (FRAMER) and 63% (ASan)), and especially in bzip group. Both perlbench and bzip produce many objects, and especially bzip recorded much higher growth in executed instructions for metadata updates and checks than perlbench and others. ASan (139%) showed better performance than FRAMER (223%) on the full-checking mode on average. FRAMER was faster than ASan for 9 tests among 28.
Performance was impacted far less than would naively be expected from the additional dynamic instruction count (metric columns 2 and 3 in Table II ). The rise in IPC (column 4) is quite considerable on average, although the figure varies greatly by benchmark. The original IPC ranged from 0.22 to 3.20 but after instrumentation there was half as much variation.
C. Data Cache Misses
A primary goal of FRAMER is to allow flexible relationships between object and header locality so that additional cache misses from metadata access can be minimised. We do not analyse L1 instruction cache miss rate since this generally has negligible performance effect on modern processors, despite our slightly inflated code. To explain the measured increase in IPC we analyse L1 D-cache misses MPKI (cache misses) and branch prediction misses MPKI. The baseline Dcache miss rate was 2.48% (Table II) but this improves with FRAMER enabled owing to repeated access to the same cache data.
In Fig. 10 , we normalise cache misses to the uninstrumented figure. The average normalised cache misses is 0.66 and 0.38 for store-only and full-checking, respectively. The miss rate is reduced since the additional operations we add have high cache affinity which dilutes the underlying miss rate of the application. Moreover, cache misses after instrumentation do not increase in proportion to increase in the number of dynamic instruction.
In the full-check mode, cache misses increased only for two test (48% for power and 1% for voronoi) on FRAMER, while ASan showed increase for four tests. ASan's normalised misses on average is 0.73, which is higher than FRAMER's 0.38. ASan's highest overhead is 197% for bc, and two tests reached increase more than by 100%. On FRAMER, power's overhead by 48% is mainly caused by the very low increase in instruction executed in producing MPKI. The rest of benchmarks' misses except two tests decreased after instrumentation, and normalised misses were below 0.5 for 21 tests among 28 working set for the full checking. As for ASan, only 13 tests' normalised misses were lower than 0.5. In the store-only mode of FRAMER, the decrease is lower than that of the full-checking, but still the half of tests' normalised misses are below 0.5. The overall cache miss rate showed FRAMER is cache-efficient and stable.
D. Instructions Executed
FRAMER increases dynamic instruction count by 124% for store-only, and 425% for full checking. Along with additional data access for metadata manipulation, this increase in instructions executed is the main contributor to runtime overhead. Our dynamic instruction penalty arises from setting up and using tagged pointers. Certain operations are easily verified at compile time. If all checking could be performed statically there would be no runtime overhead. But FRAMER inserts tags on all pointers and use sites that are readily checkable at compile time still suffer run-time overhead from pointer stripping operations since all major architectures require the top bits to be zero (or special pointer authentication code in ARM8) to avoid a segmentation fault. In addition, we sometimes have to dynamically strip the tag field even for untagged pointers, i.e. pointers to objects not tracked for bounds checking when it is uncertain if the pointer is tagged or not. The penalty of using tagged pointers is over-instrumentation -unless individual memory access is proven safe statically, we have to instrument (i.e. tag-cleaning) memory access to avoid segmentation fault. Another major source of overheads is arithmetic operations to calculate metadata locations. This makes cache misses overheads per 1000 instructions (MPKI) for full-checking lower than for store-only.
The average overhead for ASan is 226%, which is lower than FRAMER. The average excluding the highest test (1336% for bh) is 184%, while FRAMER's average excluding the highest (1098% for mcf) is 400%. The difference of slowdown between FRAMER and ASan on average (FRAMER: 213%, ASan: 139%) was not big as the difference of instruction executed due to FRAMER's cache efficiency. In summary, ASan is more efficient in instructions executed. ASan saves more dynamic instructions with using non-tagged pointers (no tag cleaning) and shadow space-only metadata storage that helps simpler derivation of metadata location, as trade-off of high locality and space usage.
Future implementations can optimise the case where conservative analysis reveals the tag never needs to be added. More discussion on optimisation is described in Section VIII-B2.
E. Branch Misses
Additional conditional branches arise in FRAMER from checking whether a big or small frame is used and in the pointer validity checks themselves. Many approaches using shadow space such as ASan may be more relieved from these branches at metadata retrieval, and have them at bounds checking using retrieved metadata.
As shown in Table II col 7, the dynamic branch density decreases slightly under FRAMER instrumentation, but the branch mis-prediction rate greatly decreases (col 8). The averages of normalised branch misses for store-only and fullchecking are 0.62 and 0.42, respectively. This shows the additional branches added achieve highly accurate branch prediction and that branch predictors are not being overloaded. Of the new branches added, the ones checking small/large frame size are completely statically predictable owing to the checking code instances being associated with a given object. And the ones checking pointer validity also predict perfectly since no out-of-bounds errors are detected.
VIII. DISCUSSION

A. Comparison with Other Approaches 1) Address Sanitizer:
First of all, ASan is integrated into Clang front end, whereas FRAMER is implemented as a LLVM pass. ASan's placement has better chances for minimal instrumentation and maximal optimisation of redundant checks.
Taking advantage of shadow space, ASan's calculation of metadata retrieval and bounds checking is simpler than FRAMER, saving executed instructions. ASan aligns an object to 8 to avoid conflicts in entries, and maps every 8 byte to its entry holding the first k bytes that are addressable. This simplifies operations of bounds checking, but makes it difficult to detect un-aligned memory access after unsafe type cast. In addition, ASan pads each object 32 bytes at minimum for redzone and extra 31 bytes for alignment, which burdens space. On contrast, FRAMER's fake padding and wrapper frames do not consume space, allowing invading other objects' territory. Just mind that adding excessive fake padding may enlarge an object's wrapper frame size, turning a small-framed object into a big-framed one, that requires indirect memory access to metadata. Table III summarises the comparison of overheads between ASan and FRAMER per benchmark. FRAMER showed higher efficiency in space and L1 D-cache hit overall. ASan's memory footprint is higher than FRAMER for the whole 28 benchmarks: increase by 23% for FRAMER's full-checking and 784% for ASan on average. ASan is based on shadow space only, while FRAMER is mainly header-based, so the evaluation showed that FRAMER is more cache-friendly: ASan's cache misses are higher than FRAMER except for six benchmarks, and normalised cache misses on average are 0.38 for FRAMER and 0.73 for ASan. This shows that FRAMER's decrease in cache misses after instrumentation is much bigger.
On average, ASan showed better performance at run-time performance and executed instructions. Normalised overheads of cycle are 3.23 for FRAMER and 2.39 for ASan, and overheads of executed instructions are 5.25 (FRAMER) and 3.26 (ASan). Among the 28 benchmarks, FRAMER was faster for 9 tests, and showed less increase in dynamic instruction counts for 8 tests. As shown in Table III , the benchmarks where ASan is faster roughly match those with less instructions executed.
2) SGXBounds: Both SGXBounds and FRAMER are based on tagged pointers. The main difference is that SGXBounds uses 32 bits for a tag among 64 bits, while FRAMER tags only upper spare 16 bits that are common. SGXBounds is not applicable to many 64-bit machine.
SGXBounds's retrieving an upper bound first not the base (lower bound) like FRAMER, may save some overheads if we perform overflow-only checking, which is more common. However, using a footer makes systems slightly more vulnerable to metadata pollution at the same time without near complete memory safety. For both over/under underflow checking, we do not consider our derivation of the base, not the upper bound, as a weakness. In addition, FRAMER's frame encoding can be easily integrated to SGXBounds' design.
3) MPX:
In principle, FRAMER could utilize MPX for a faster instrumentation when used for spatial safety. We showed FRAMER is more cache-friendly, but it could be made even faster if a single instruction implemented the complete tag decode operation, splitting apart the tagged pointer into an untagged object pointer and separate header pointer in another register. This would be a fairly simple, register-toregister instruction, operating on general purpose registers. Since this has not used the D-cache, an enhancement would be to compare the pointer against a bounds limit at hardcoded offset loaded from the header, but the best design requires further study.
4) Baggy Bounds and Low-Fat pointers:
Baggy bounds [3] re-aligns objects and adds padding to them to prevents conflicts entries in shadow space. One of benefits of FRAMER is allowance of wrapper frames being overlapped, which removes both superfluous padding and metadata conflicts. In a similar way, our frame-based encoding is less intrusive than Low-fat pointers' [28] , that requires objects to be grouped and aligned by their size.
B. Additional Optimisations 1) Runtime checks only at pointer arithmetic:
We aligned objects by 16 bytes at the moment due to llvm.memset intrinsic function. On this alignment, we have spare 4 bits at the end of offset for small-framed. (We already have spare bits for big-framed ones.) Using the bits, we can mark out-of-bounds pointers at pointer arithmetic, and report errors when they are dereferenced. This way, we expect to remove duplicated runtime checks, since the pointer may be used for memory access multiple times.
2) Compiler Optimisation: There are more optimisations we could use. Duplicate runtime checks can be eliminated using dominator tree. SoftBound [33] reported that their simple dominator-based redundant check elimination improved performance by 13% and claimed more advanced elimination [6] , [52] can reduce more overheads.
Loop optimization showed minor impact on reducing overheads, even for some SPEC benchmarks whose number of hoisted run-time checks reached hundreds at static time. Our naive optimization skipping untagging improved performance more than state-of-the-art loop hoist pass. Static points-to analysis [45] , [46] , as long as it does not assume the absence of memory errors, potentially enables many tags and bounds checks to be removed at compile time.
C. Hardware Implementation of FRAMER
We believe FRAMER's encoding is at its best when it is implemented as instruction set extensions. As briefly mentioned in VIII-A3, the increase in the number of executed instructions, the main contributor to slowdown of FRAMER, can be resolved with new instructions. Tag-cleaning would be just one instruction. Moreover, decision of wrapper frame on memory allocation or calculation of metadata locations from tagged pointers can be implemented as a single instruction, respectively.
In addition, hardware-based FRAMER can overcome MPX's overheads. MPX suffers from space overheads and even crashes due to the limited space to store per-pointer metadata in the bounds table, especially for pointer-intensive programs. FRAMER's per-object metadata in the header and compact-size table can reduce the space. FRAMER's tracking objects also removes metadata updates at pointer assignment, that causes performance loss of MPX.
IX. CONCLUSION
We designed, implemented and evaluated FRAMER, a software capability model with object granularity. FRAMER enables a variety of security applications for detecting memory safety errors. Compared to existing approaches, our framebased offset encoding is more flexibile both in metadata association and memory management, while still offering a fairly simple calculation to map from arbitrary pointers to metadata locations. In addition, its intrinsic memory and cacheefficiency make it potentially attractive for direct hardware support.
